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Abstract
OpenSSL is an open-source library that is used to communicate data through
a secure protocol known as TLS. TLS is used for secure communication over a
channel widely over the internet for various applications both desktop and web
like web browsers, emails, chat applications. In April 2014 a security bug called
as heartbleed [1] was found which is very catastrophic that sensitive information
like cookies, session data, and even private keys of the server. This vulnerability
allows stealing of the contents of the RAM by anyone on the Internet. This also
allows the attackers to extract the private keys from the server which can be used
to decrypt the HTTPS traffic by doing a man-in-the-middle attack [2] and eaves-
drop on sensitive data and also to impersonate another user. In this thesis report
we study the heartbleed vulnerability in depth, propose a method to exploit the
vulnerability and develop a tool to exploit.
Key words: Vulnerability, Heartbleed, OpenSSL, TLS [3].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Secure Sockets Layer(SSL)
SSL is the short form for Secure Sockets Layer. When using HTTP, the network
administrator or the ISP can see the data that the user is sending to the server.
So, there was a need to encrypt the data that is communicated to the server. So,
SSL protocol has been designed to encrypt the communication between the client
and the server. The main goal of SSL is to provide a secure communication in both
directions for any arbitrary data. In case of TCP protocol which is widely used
for communication over the internet, TCP handles everything from decomposing
the messages into packets and re-assembling them after receiving. These messages
are not encrypted. Any person or attacker who can access the channel in which
the transmission is occurring can read the messages as they are not encrypted.
This protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. So, there was a need
to develop a protocol which can be used for secure communication and which is
encrypted so that it is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. Below the SSL
layer, HTTPS is implemented just as the HTTP protocol. When SSL/TLS is used
the attacker might have access to the medium of the communication, but as the
messages are encrypted, he wont know what messages are being sent and received.
All the information that the attacker could get is the IP of the client, how much
data is communicated and which encryption is used. The attacker can also close
the communication but can never know the data that is being communicated. [?]
In short, HTTP + SSL [6] = HTTPS
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Figure 1.1: Working model of SSL protocol
1.2 Handshake
When the TCP connection is established, the client starts an SSL handshake with
the server. The client tells in this handshake different details like the version of
SSL/TLS it is using, the set of cipher-suites it supports and the the compression
to be used. The server chooses the latest version that is supported by both client
and the server.
After this, a certificate which is trusted by the client or verified by any other
third party that the client trusts is sent from the server to the client.
After the verification of the certificate and being sure that the server is au-
thentic but not any other third party, both exchange a key which will be used for
encrypting and decrypting the future communication using symmetric communi-
cation. Since this is a symmetric encryption, the same key can be used for both
2
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encryption and decryption.
Handshake process demands a lot of computing power and its costly in terms
of resources if a handshake has to be performed every time a connection is made
between the client and server. So, a feature named heartbeat has been introduced
into the SSL protocol.
1.3 Heartbeat
Heartbeat makes sure that only one handshake is enough for the client to keep the
connection alive for a session. A handshake is made between the server and the
client in the beginning and the server sends its public key to the client through the
certificate. To keep the connection alive and avoid another handshake for another
request (which takes time and uses a lot of resources), a payload of small data
is sent from the client to the server. This is called heartbeat. In response the
server sends the same payload data which says that the connection is kept alive.
The size of the payload data can be anything between 1byte and 64 kilo bytes.
This payload also have information about session data, size of payload, message of
payload etc. If the session times out another handshake is needed and heartbeats
are used to keep the connection alive. This is added as an extension to the SSL
protocol and implemented into OpenSSL in 2012.
Figure 1.2: Working model of Heartbeat protocol
3
1.4 Heartbleed Introduction
1.4 Heartbleed
While performing a heartbeat after a handshake, if the client sends a payload
of size 2kb the server has to respond with the same data to the client. While
implementing heartbleed in OpenSSL, the part to check the size of payload data
has been overlooked by the open source contributors. So, when a client sends a
payload data of 2 byte size and the size of payload data is set to 20 kilo bytes,
the server sends 20 kilo bytes of data from the RAM to the client because it is
not checked by the server. Since this vulnerability uses heartbeat to exploit, the
name heartbleed has been given to the vulnerability.
The OpenSSL versions from 1.0.1 to 1.0.1f are affected by this heartbleed bug
because of a mistake in implementing the heartbeat feature. This vulnerability
gives an attacker the access to the private memory of the server that uses the above
mentioned versions of OpenSSL.A maximum of 64 kb of data can be retrieved at
a time using this vulnerability. By exploiting this a number of times, an attacker
can get sufficient of sensitive data which may include
1. Primary keys on the server
2. Data for authentication like username and passwords
3. Private content like email, instant messaging etc
Figure 1.3: Figure explaining how heartbleed works
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Literature Survey
2.1 TLS protocol
The TLS protocol facilitates applications that use client server communication to
communicate over a network such that it will prevent man in the middle attacks,
tampering and eavesdropping the data that is being communicated. As protocols
are designed so that they can operate with or without TLS, it is very important for
the client to intimate the server that the client and server will be communicating
using TLS [7] protocol. This can be achieved in two methods. One of the method
is to use a different port number for TLS connections (just like we use 443 port
to tell that the data is communicated using HTTPS). Another method the client
requesting the server is that it uses only TLS protocol, which can be achieved by
using protocol-specific mechanism.
After the client and the server agree to use TLS [8] protocol, they also agree
to a connection after undergoing a handshake. While undergoing this handshake,
the server and client agree on different parameters that are going to be used to
establish the security of the connection:
1. When a client connects to a server that supports TLS connections it tells
list of cipher suites and hash functions that it supports.
2. The server chooses a hash function and a cipher suite that is also supported
by it and intimates the client about them.
3. The server normally then returns its identity in the form of a certificate.
5
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The sent certificate normally contains the name of the server, the authority
who certified it, and the server’s public encryption key.
4. The client can contact the server of the certificate issuer and verify the
authenticity of the server before proceeding further.
5. In order to create session keys that are further used to make the connection
secure, the client generate a random number, encrypts it using the servers
public key and sends it to the server. This encrypted number can only be
decrypted using the private key of the server.
6. Using the encrypted random number, both the client and server create a
’master secret’ generate a session-key that is later used for both encryption
and decryption.
This is the handshake process which is the beginning of any secure TLS
connection and the session-key is used for both encryption and decryption
until the connection is closed.
Incase any of the steps mentioned above fail, TLS handshake is said to be a
failure and the connection is not opened.
2.2 Heartbeat
2.2.1 Heartbeat Hello extension [4]
Hello extensions are used by a communicating device so that they can indi-
cate that they support heartbeats. It also has the independence of choosing if
its willing to receive the heartbeat request messages and also willing to send
heartbeat respond messaegs. To allow the heartbeat messages it has to use
peer allowed to send in the form of HeartbeatMode. If it is not willing to use
heartbeats, peer not allowed to send can be sent in the form of Heartbeat it
can use the peer not allowed to send mode. If one of the machines indicate
peer not allowd to send, the other machine should not use send heartbeat mes-
sages and should close the connection. Heartbeat hello extension is predefined to
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be sent in a specific format which is as follows.
enum {
peer allowed to send(1),
peer not allowed to send(2),
(255) }
HeartbeatMode;
struct {
HeartbeatMode mode;
} HeartbeatExtension;
If a machine receives a mode that is not defined previously, and error message
should be sent as a response.
2.2.2 Heartbeat protocol
The Heartbeat protocol is an addition to the TLS protocol. Itconsists of two types
of messages: HeartbeatResponse and HeartbeatRequest.
enum {
heartbeat request(1),
heartbeat response(2),
(255)
} HeartbeatMessageType;
A HearbeatRequest may be received anytime while the server and client are
connected. When it is received, a HeartBeatResponse should be sent in reply to
the request. It is only received or sent after a handshake is done. On the other
hand, if a handshake is started, the heartbeats transmission should be ended and
the message should be archived immediately. There must be only one Heartbeat-
Request message in between the client and the server at anytime until either the
appropriate response message is received or till the session expires.
2.2.3 Protocol Messages
The protocol messages include details like the type of the request (request or
response) and payload and padding details which are arbitrary. This message has
7
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to be in the prescribed format which is as follows.
struct {
HeartbeatMessageType type;
uint16 payload length;
opaque payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload length];
opaque padding[padding length];
} HeartbeatMessage;
Message type attribute signifies if the message is a request or a response.
payload length attribute signifies the payload length which is being sent. Payload
attribute details any arbitrary payload because it is not mandatory. Padding
attribute signifies the padding content which is random and the payload should
not be taken into account by the receiver. HeartbeatMessage has a length which
is TLSPlaintext.length.type field length should be 1 byte,and payload length is 2.
So, the payload lenth will be 3. This makes the padding length to have a value
whose minimum is atleast 16. Since the padding attribute is random, the client
or server should use the padding of length atleast 16 and it is random. On the
receiving end, the padding should be ignored. The received HeartbeatMessage
should be archived if the length of the message is too big.
2.2.4 Liveliness check
HeartbeatRequest messages assure the client or server which sends the message
that the connection between the client and the server is alive.
2.3 Heartbleed
[9] While implementing the heartbeat feature into the TLS protocol a mistake
was done by the open-source contribution which resulted in the heartbleed bug.
The code which is responsible for this bug is
p = &s− > s3− >rrec.data[0]
[...]
hbtype = *p++;
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n2s(p, payload);
pl = p;
[...]
buffer = OPENSSL malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
bp = buffer;
[...]
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
The structure rrec contains the received message, which details the data about
the request. The first byte is tells the receiver that it is a heartbeat messager and
following two bytes tells about the length of the payload data. If the request is
an authentic one, this length should be equal to the length of the payload data
which is sent in the request.
The mistake in the code is that it doesnt make sure that the payload length
which has been sent equal to the actual payload data in the request which brings
a loophole to ask for a data of bigger size. It then stores the data of the size that
has been set as payload length in the message that has been received and sends
the data as a response to the receiver. So, this loophole can be exploited if the
payload length is set higher and the server will copy the data from the RAM of
the server and sends it as the response. The payload length be set to a maximum
of 64 kilo bytes.
While processing a HeartbeatRequest [10] message that has longer payload
length than it originally has, the additional content is copied from the RAM of
the server and is responsed to the client and it may contain the data that has
been processed previously like usernames, passwords, cookies, session which are
sensitive.
OpenSSL [1] team has already made a patch for this which is too simple. It
just checks if the payload length mentioned and the actual payload length are
same or not. If they differ nothing is returned as response.
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2.4 RSA Encryption
RSA is the first asymmetric-key cryptographic model which is being used practi-
cally for secure communications. In this model there are two types keys.
Figure 2.1: Figure explaining how RSA works
A public key is used for encryption and a private key is used for decryption.
This model mainly depends on the fact that it is very difficult to factorize a number
which is the product of two very large prime numbers. This is also called as the
factoring problem. It is modelled in 1977 by three researchers Ron Rivest, Leonard
Adleman and Adi Shamir. So, it has been named after their initial letters.
A devise which uses RSA [11] creates and tells the whole world about it public
key which is created by multiplying two very large primes which are very distant
and also an arbitrary value. These prime numbers are the key to the model and
they must be kept as a secret. The public key can be used to encrypt the message
and to decrypt private key is used. To break the encryption one must first break
the factoring problem and this is not possible with the present knowledge and
technologies. This is called the RSA problem.
10
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The RSA model consists of three main steps. The first one is key generation,
the second one is encryption and the final one is decryption.
2.4.1 Key generation
RSA model consists of a public key and a private key which are discussed earlier.
The public key is open to everyone. Only a private key can be used to decrypt the
messages which are encrypted using the public key. The procedure to generate
the public and private keys in the RSA algorithm is as follows.
1. Two very large prime numbers p and q which are very distant apart are
chosen randomly.
2. The prime numbers p and q are multiplied and stored in a variable n.
(a) This computed value will be used later as the modulus of the keys.
The length of n in bits is called as keylength.
3. The value (n) is computed as the multiplication of (p 1) and (q 1) where
is called as totient. This totient value should be kept as a secret.
4. A positive integer e is chosen randomly which is less than the totient value
and is coprime with the totient
(a) The public key which will be released will have the public key compo-
nent as e.
5. The value d is computed as the inverse of e with modulas as the totient
usually using extended Eucliedean algorithm.
(a) The private key will have the private key component as d.
The public key will have the product of prime numbers i.e. n and the public
key component e. The private key will have n and the private key component
which must kept as a secret.
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2.4.2 Encryption
Alice sends her public key to Bob and Bob keeps the private key d secret.
When Bob wants to send a messages lets say M to Alice, he converts the
message M into an integer so that 0 m ¡ n and gcd(m, n) = 1 by using a
padding scheme which is agreed by both parties. Bob uses the public key of
alice and calculates the corresponding ciphertext as
c = me(modn)
Bob sends this ciphertext c to Alice.
2.4.3 Decryption
Alice will decrypt m by using c and her private key exponent as
m = cd(modn)
12
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Proposed Work
3.1 Introduction
The main function of heartbeat is to communicate arbitrary data between client
and server signifying that the connection is still alive. Client sends a message with
attributes message length which can be upto 64 kb and the payload data. But
because of the vulnerability, if the client claims that it has sent 64 kb of data and
actually sent 1kb of payload data, then the server responds with 64 kb of data of
which only 1kb is payload data and the remaining 63 kb are the contents of the
RAM of the server.
This allows the attacker to access random portions of memory of the server.
The attacker doesnt have the independence of choosing which part of the memory
but he can get significant amount of sensitive data if he tries many times. Since
this is part of the heartbeat process this isnt logged and we cannot trace the
attacker who attacked.
3.2 Heart vulnerability detection
To check if a server is vulnerable to heartbleed, we make a handshake first and
send a payload data of 0kb as payload to the server and set the size of payload
data as 16kb. If we receive a payload greater than 0kb then we can say that the
server is vulnerable to heartbleed.
13
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3.3 Heartbleed exploit
To exploit the vulnerability, we send a heartbeat without any payload data and
set the size of payload data as 16kb and the server responds with 16kb of data
from the RAM of the server. First we make a handshake with the server and later
we send the heartbeat data multiple times to the server as below.
18 // content type which tells that this is a heartbeat
03 02 // this tells that the TLS version used is 1.1
00 03 // length of the payload metadata that is being sent
01 // signifies that request is sent from client
40 00 // size of payload message.
// payload data (payload data is empty here)
This will be the content of the heartbeat we are going to use for the vulnera-
bility detection and exploitation.
In this, we set the payload data to be empty and the payload size to be 16kb.
So, we receive 16kb of data from the server in response.
3.4 Extracting private key [5]
We know that https uses RSA encryption to encrypt the data that is communi-
cated. An obvious solution is just factorizing n, but with the current knowledge
about factorizing and latest technologies, it is very difficult to factorize n. Because
of heartbleed, the attack is very simple: As the private key resides in the RAM of
the server, we can obtain the values of p and q. The main obstacle in identifying
the values is that they are represented as big numbers little endian [12] in memory.
So, we consider all the consecutive 128 bits as a potential value of p and divide n
by p. If p divides n, it is the value we need and we can calculate the private key
using that. Once the private key has been extracted, it can be used to decrypt
the https traffic if available.
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Chapter 4
Impuckylementation and Results
4.1 Implementation
The vulnerability has been tested on mail.nitrkl.ac.in ( only for demonstration and
education purposes ) and unfortunately, the site is vulnerable to heartbleed. We
first checked the mail server on port 443 and found that the server is vulnerable
to heartbleed. Later we exploited the vulnerability. 16kb of data has been fetched
from the server multiple times to get more sensitive information like usernames
and passwords. The data that has been extracted using heartbleed is shown in
screenshots as follows.
Figure 4.1: Result 1
In the above screenshot, we can see the secondary key data like username and
password of an user exploited using heartbleed.
In the above screenshot, we can see the cookie data, session id of an user being
15
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Figure 4.2: Result 2
exploited using heartbleed.
Figure 4.3: Result 3
In the above screenshot, we can see the extracted private key using heartbleed.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In todays digital world, its very important to protect the communication channels
since we deal with sensitive information on daily basis. So, cryptography and net-
work security plays an important role in communication through computers. Even
after immense efforts, there are many security loopholes which are patched daily.
In this report we explore about a latest and catastrophic bug in the implementa-
tion of OpenSSL named as heartbleed In our work, we have shown how ssl works,
what a handshake is, what a heartbeat is and what the vulnerability is about.
We proposed an algorithm to check if a website is vulnerable to heartbleed and
implemented it. We also proposed an algorithm to exploit the vulnerability and
implemented it. We also tested it against some websites only for demonstration
and educational purposes.
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